Week 8 Intentionality
Grass is green
An ant is crawling on a patch of sand. As it crawls, it traces a line in the sand. By pure chance the line that it traces curves and recrosses itself in such a way that it ends up looking like a recognizable caricature of Winston Churchill. Has the ant traced a picture of Winston Churchill, a picture that depicts Churchill?
- Intentionality -v- Action plan "The mark of the mental"
- Aboutness
- Representation
All and only mental states are intentional
Julius mentioned Martin Heidegger's Dasein
Dasein is a central concept in Heidegger's philosophy, often translated as "being-there" or "being-in-the-world." It refers to the unique mode of existence of human beings, characterized by their being-in-the-world and their being-with-others. Dasein is not simply a subject separate from the world but is fundamentally constituted by its relations and interactions with the world and other beings.
Intentionality plays a crucial role in Heidegger's understanding of Dasein. He argues that Dasein is inherently intentional, meaning that it is always directed towards or about something beyond itself. Our thoughts, feelings, and actions are always intentional in the sense that they have content and are directed towards objects, goals, or states of affairs in the world.
How does a brain state/mental state acquire this meaning
Causal Theory
Casual relations to the world.
We use the Causal Theory to ... Putnam's theory #todo
Resemblance
- Ambiguity
- Resemblance is ambiguous and context-dependent. What counts as a relevant resemblance for one purpose might not be relevant for another.
- e.g. Two objects might resemble each other in shape but not in color.
- Symmetry
- One object might resemble another without the reverse being true. The John's picture example: The picture and resemble John but such resemblance relationship is not invertible
- No Image
- Rejects the idea that mental representations are like images or pictures in the head.
- Meaning and reference are not determined by internal mental images but rather by causal and social relations to the external world.
- Natural Kinds
- Terms referring to natural kinds (e.g., "water", "gold") have a special kind of resemblance relation.
Causal theory of content
Mental state M is about X only if there is a causal connection between M and X.
Externalism about content
What a person's thoughts are about is not #todo
You can't always tell what you are thinking about, as a takeaway from the causal theory
Putnam's Brain in a Vat(BiV)
P1. If I am a brain in a vat, then my thought "I am a brain in a vat" is false
- Putnam distinguishes “vat” from a "vat in the image(Whatever causes me to have "a brain in a vat" thought)"
P2. If I am not a BiV then my thought over BiV is false
C. "I am a BiV"is always false
He argues that the scenario of being a brain in a vat, while physically possible, is logically incoherent due to the way it undermines the meaning and reference of our thoughts and language.
Here's the core of Putnam's BiV argument and the supporting text from his paper:
The Argument:
- If I am a brain in a vat, then my thought "I am a brain in a vat" is false. This is because, as a BiV, my words and thoughts would not refer to real-world objects like vats and brains, but rather to the simulations or images generated by the computer controlling my experiences. So, "vat" would refer to a "vat in the image" and not a real vat.
- If I am not a brain in a vat, then my thought about being a BiV is also false. This is straightforward; if I'm not a BiV, then the thought that I am is obviously false.
- Therefore, the thought "I am a brain in a vat" is always false. Since the thought is false in both possible scenarios (being a BiV or not), it is necessarily false. This implies that the scenario of being a BiV is logically incoherent and cannot be true.
Supporting Text from Putnam's Paper:
- Meaning and Reference: Putnam emphasizes that the meaning and reference of our words and thoughts depend on causal connections to the external world. In the BiV scenario, these connections are severed, and our words refer only to the simulations generated by the computer.
- The Ant and Churchill Analogy: Putnam uses the analogy of an ant tracing a line that resembles Churchill to illustrate that resemblance alone is not sufficient for representation or reference. Similarly, the experiences of a BiV might resemble real-world experiences, but they lack the necessary causal connections to make them genuine representations of the external world.
- The Tree Example: Putnam further elaborates on the importance of causal connections by imagining a scenario where individuals have mental images and words that resemble trees but have no causal connection to actual trees. He argues that in such a case, their thoughts and words would not refer to trees, even though they might be qualitatively identical to the thoughts and words of someone who does have a concept of trees.
- The Hypnotized Person Example: Putnam uses the example of a hypnotized person who believes they understand Japanese but cannot actually use the language in the right context. This illustrates that the feeling of understanding or having a mental representation is not sufficient for genuine reference and intentionality.
Implications:
Putnam's BiV argument challenges skepticism by demonstrating that the skeptical scenario itself is self-refuting. If we can even think about the possibility of being a BiV, then we cannot actually be one, because our thoughts would not have the meaning and reference they seem to have. This argument supports a form of externalism about mental content, where the meaning and reference of our thoughts are determined not just by internal mental states but also by causal connections to the external world.